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New Mexico's Forgotten Nuclear Tests:
Projects Gnome (1961) and Gasbuggy (1967)
FERENC M. SZASZ

On 16 July 1945, scientists from the Manhattan Project detonated an
atomic device at Trinity Site, in the northwest corner of the Alamogordo
Bombing Range in central New Mexico. The select group of eyewitnesses
watched in awe as the mushroom cloud rose to 20,000 feet and slowly
drifted north-northeast over the Chupadera Mesa toward Oklahoma and
Kansas. With this, the state of New Mexico entered history as "the birth~
place of the Atomic Age."1
Five days after the explosion, Stafford Warren, the physician in
charge of health safety for the Manhattan Project, wrote to the overall
head-General Leslie R. Groves. In this lengthy missive, Warren cautioned Groves that central New Mexico was far too populated for further
nuclear explosions. He recommended that any future tests be held in a
location with a radius of at least 150 miles without people. 2
Unfortunately, the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
could discover no location that fit this requirement. Consequently, the
government compromised. In December 1950, President Harry S Truman
announced that the Nevada Test Site (NTS)-sixty-five miles northwest
of Las Vegas-would serve as America's premier continental nuclear
testing ground. In January 1951, the AEC began above-ground atomic
testing at the NTS. By 1958, Nevada had witnessed over one hundred
such explosions. 3
At various times, however, the AEC selected other "off site" areas
to detonate underground nuclear devices. During the 1960s, they chose
. two locations in New Mexico. The first was Gnome (1961), about twentyFerenc M. Szasz is a Professor of History at the University of New Mexico.
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five miles southeast of Carlsbad; the second was Gasbuggy (1967), about
fifty-five miles east of Farmington.
'
Each of New Mexico's three nuclear detonations proved
groundbreaking in every sense of the term. The Trinity test, of course,
inaugurated the Atomic Age. Project Gnome was widely praised as the
first "Atoms for Peace" nuclear explosion, a test designed to harness
the power of the atom for peaceful purposes. In a similar fashion,
Gasbuggy gained publicity as the first joint U.S. government-private
industry (EI Paso Natural Gas) effort to use nuclear explosions to improve the production of natural gas fields, inaugurating a partnership
that everyone expected to continue. With these tests, New Mexico joined
Alaska as the only state outside Nevada where the government has
detonated nuclear bombs at three separate locations. 4
The dubious prominence of New Mexico in this regard points to the
important role that the state has played in postwar nuclear history. It
also points to a variety of ecological dilemmas that have resulted from
these nuclear experiments. All three explosions released man-made radionuclides into the atmosphere and drove them deep into the surface
of the earth. Although the AEC and its successor agency, the Department of Energy (DOE) have cleaned up each site on several occasions,
radioactive trace elements from these explosions still remain. Government monitors continue to visit each site on a regular basis to measure
surface contamination and to insure that the underground radiation has
not migrated into the water table. Consequently, the saga of these three
nuclear tests is not just limited to the New Mexican past; it affects the
New Mexico future as well.
Trinity
One can best understand the Gnome and Gasbuggy events by starting with an overview of Trinity. In the spring of 1944, a small team from
the secret city of Los Alamos (Site Y) began the search for a suitable
location to test the plutonium weapon under construction by the Manhattan Project. The test location needed to be relatively flat, with basically good weather, isolated from any center of population, and close
enough to Los Alamos to facilitate transportation. At one time scientists considered eight locations-including the Malpais region south of
Grants-but eventually decided on the Jornada del Muerto high desert
that lies to the east of Socorro. One reason for the choice lay in the fact
that the federal government had already confiscated ·much of this land
for the Alamogordo Bombing Range. 5 It proved relatively uncomplicated
to transfer the northwest corner to the Manhattan Project.
Construction began in November 1944, and within months workers
had erected the world's first gigantic outdoor laboratory. Miles of roads,
a base camp, and thousands of feet of wire appeared almost overnight.
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Three earth-and-concrete observation bunkers and numerous unmanned
posts surrounded Ground Zero, where scientists hauled the atomic device to the top of a 1OO-foot steel tower. After a night of violent rain and
a two-hour postponement, head meteorologist Jack Hubbard gave the
clearance for a 5 :30 detonation.
.
The power of the fissioned atom proved greater than anyone had
ever imagined. The blast was heard in three states and could have been
seen from another planet. Where the ball of fire touched the earth, it
fused the sand into a greenish-gray, radioactive glass-later termed
"Atomsite" or "Trinitite." The mushroom cloud broke into three parts,
with the brunt moving slowly east over the continent, spreading radioactivity over an area as large as Australia. Three weeks later, at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the world at large similarly learned about the power of the
fissioned atom.
Afterwards, federal and state officials hoped to turn New Mexico's
Trinity Site into a National Monument. The Albuquerque Journal argued that such a monument would long keep the state in the public eye. 6
Unsolveable dilemmas regarding surface radiation, plus the fact that
Trinity Site lay within the re-named White Sands Missile Range, prevented this from occurring. In 1965, however, the National Park Service
declared Trinity Site a National Historic Landmark and a decade later
they designated it a National Historic Site. Twice a year, in spring and
fall, the Army opens the Trinity area for visitors. Although Los Alamos
has thrice cleaned up the region and buried the Trinitite (no one knows
precisely where) Army officials still limit on-site visits to about three
hours. Even today, however, the Department of Defense Environmental
Management Program maintains responsibility for cleaning up the region. 7
During the summer of 1995, as the Allies commemorated the 50th
anniversary of· the end of the Second World War, Socorro hosted an
international gathering of Manhattan Project veterans, anti-nuclear protesters, and newsmedia figures. The Army opened Trinity Site for a 16
July 1995, fiftieth anniversary visit that drew several thousand spectators. As the international news coverage of this event showed, Trinity
Site, New Mexico, has emerged with a secure niche in the national
memory of the World War II years.
Plowshare
The second and third New Mexico nuclear detonations proved quite
different from the Trinity Site explosion. Neither Gnome nor Gasbuggy
formed part of the nation's military effort. Rather, they were keystones
in President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Plowshare Program, an attempt to
harness the destructive power of the atom for purposes of peace. Although front-page stories at the time, Gnome and Gasbuggy are virtually forgotten today, even by many local residents. The modest historic

350

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OCTOBER 1998

markers placed at the sites reflect this oblivion as well as the dashed
hopes surrounding each detonation.
During the early 1950s, the AEC first conceived the idea of using
underground nuclear explosions for large-scale construction projects.
Aerial photographs of the) 952 Hydrogen bomb tests at Eniwetok Atoll
in the South Pacific showed that the explosion had created a huge crater,
which might, conceivably, be turned into a harbor. Moreover, such fission explosions released far fewer radionuclides into the atmosphere
than conyentional atomic bombs, although A-bombs were used to "trigger" the hydrogen devices. Viewed purely in economic terms, this meant
that thermonuclear bombs might be able to move large amounts of earth
at very little expense, perhaps as low as twenty cents per cubic yard. 8
The Suez crisis of 1956 brought this concern to sharp focus. After
Egyptian president Gamal Nasser closed the Suez Canal by sinking ships
in the waterway, Harold Brown, director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL) suggested that the West could cut a new canal across Israel by using controlled nuclear explosions. A French engineer published
the first book on the subj ect that same year. In 1957, the 1.7 ki loton (kt)
shot Ranier at the NTS was fully contained underground. The confluence
of these events led LRL physicist HerbertYork to gather scientists from
Los Alamos~ Sandia National Laboratory, and the LRL in a secret
Livermore Conference to discuss the matter. Thus was born the concept
of "geographical engineering" via underground nuclear detonations. 9
The idea caught on in both the scientific and engineering communities. The second conference on the theme was held in San Francisco in
1959, and opened to the public, while the third in Davis, California, five
years later, evoked even greater response. 1O The last large symposium
on Engineering with Nuclear Explosives was held in Las Vegas, Nevada,
in January 1970. By that time, however, the concept had fallen into disrepute. 11
The overall name for programs such as this emerged in 1957 as
"Project Plowshare." The term derived from the famous passage in Isaiah
chapter two, verse four: "And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up
sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more." President
Eisenhower always gave Plowshare his strongest support.
During the late 1950s, the government did yeoman work to popularize the Plowshare concept. The U.S. Post Office issued a variety of stamps
and first-day covers to celebrate the "Atoms for Peace" program. New
York sculptor Moissaye Marans created a fourteen-and-a-half-foot
statue to symbolize the spirit of the venture: a stylized Old Testament
figure standing upon a plow, holding a broken sword in his hands. The
sculpture won several awards and was widely praised. 12
The Atoms for Peace program bolstered the late 1950s optimism regarding the future of the nuclear world. Scientists spoke of utilizing
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underground explosions to cut canals, dig harbors, redirect the flow of
rivers, build dams, and enhance underground aquifers. Mining engi-.
neers hoped that nuclear blasts might reveal new ways to extract oil
from tar sands and shale and increase natural gas from low production
fields. 13 Other scientists dreamed of using nuclear explosions for weather'
control, space travel, or even a nuclear-powered aircraft. The respected
scientific press joined this chorus. Gerald W. Johnson and Harold Brown
suggested in Scientific American, that the nation was "on the verge of a
new period of ~geographical engineering. '''14 Writing in Physics Today,
David B. Lambert argued that while blast radiation could never be completely eliminated from these crateringexplosions, it could be "controlled to the extent that radioactive hazards need not be an obstacle to
the industrial exp loitation of this technique. "15
The most prominent spokesman for this position was Manhattan
Project veteran Edward Teller. An enthusiastic promoter, Teller's assur~
ances were often quoted by the national press. On one occasion, Teller
. stated, "I can say, not with certainty but with quite a bit of hope, that we
can make nuclear explosives so clean that the worry about radioactivity
in its peaceful applications may disappear completely.':16 On another, he
promised that nuclear engineering could "change the earth's surface to
suit US."I?
Some historians have viewed the scientists' enthusiasm for Plowshare programs as just a facade for the continued testing' of nuclear
weapons. 18 This cynical view, however, fails to acknowledge the dreams
of many Manhattan Project pioneers, who, from the 1940s forward, had
hoped that the positive aspects of the sub-atomic world would eventually outweigh the theme of nuclear destruction. Physicists Joseph Rotblat,
J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Edward Teller had all expressed such views.
Alice Kimball Smith, who had lived in Los Alamos during the war, similarly recalled that the hopes for peaceful applications of atomic power
formed a central part of many wartime Los Alamos conversations. 19
. Still, the AEC courted public approval for their "Atoms for Peace"
idea for another very pragmatic reason. By the late 1950s, popular fears
concerning fallout dangers from above-ground atomic testing were running at full tide. Groups ranging from the Nevada League of Women
Voters to British philosopher Bertrand Russell to Nobel Laureate Linus
Pauling had begun to call for an immediate halt to all above-ground
testing. In 1956, Democratic Party candidate Adlai Stevenson made this
a major issue of his presidential campaign. International scientists at the
influential Pugwash gatherings took this consensus back to their respective governments. 20 Consequently, on 1 November 1958, the U.S.,
U.S.S.R., and Great Britain began a voluntary moratorium on aboveground nuclear testing. At the Geneva talks on this matter, President
Eisenhower tried (unsuccessfully) to have Plowshare detonations, which
were intended to be open to all observers, exempted from the morato-
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rium. Soviet spokesmen protested, however, arguing that any nuclear
explosion could have military applications.
The 1958 test ban agreement brought the AEC's Plowshare plans to
an abrupt halt. All such projects went back to the drawing board, where
they remained until 1961. That year, the Soviets broke the ban and renewed their nuclear tests. Immediately, President John F. Kennedy announced that America would resume its above-ground testing as well.
After two more years of testing, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev and
President Kennedy signed the 1963 treaty that banned all atmospheric
and oceanic explosions. Henceforth, the only nuclear experiments allowed would be those detonated beneath the earth's surface.
The 1958-61 test ban had major consequences for several states,
especially Alaska and New Mexico. The three-year gap allowed Alaskan Natives, university scientists, and anti-nuclear activists to quash a
proposed Plowshare program (Chariot) that would have drawn on three
to four underground nuclear explosions to create a harbor in northwest
Alaska near Point Hope. 21 With Chariot in disfavor, the AEC turned its
attention to Gnome as the first Plowshare test. And Gnome was scheduled for New Mexico.
Gnome
During the Plowshare years, New Mexico had a strong friend in
Washington in the person of Democratic Senator Clinton P. Anderson.
Born in South Dakota, young Anderson had studied journalism at the
University of Wisconsin before tuberculosis drove him to New Mexico.
After a close brush with death, he recovered to become a respected
businessman in the fields of journalism and insurance. Anderson believed, not without reason, that New Mexico had saved his life, and
while in'Congress he worked hard to bring federal largesse to his adopted
home state. After brief service as Harry S Truman's Secretary of Agriculture, Anderson sought appointment on the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. He served on that crucial body from 1951 until
1972. Thus, Anderson found himself in an ideal position to direct numerous AEC funds toward New Mexico. In 1961, he estimated that twofifths of all federal spending in the state had some form of atomic
connection. 22 Just before the 1961 Gnome detonation, Anderson credited atomic energy as "the keystone of the research and development
structure" of New Mexico. 23 Anderson especially encouraged the matchup of Plowshare, Gnome, and the town of Carlsbad.
In 1961, Carlsbad contained about 26,000 people and ranked as the
sixth-largest city in the state. The local economy revolved largely around
the mining of potash for fertilizer, and the 20,000 acres of irrigated cotton, alfalfa, maize, barley, castor beans, and pasture grass from the impounded Pecos River. Tourism was also vital to the region, for the famed
Carlsbad Caverns had been part of the National Park system since 1923
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Project Gnome Site. From Projects Gnome and Sedan: The Plowshare Program
(Defense Nuclear Agency document no. DNA 6029F). Map Courtesy of Defense
Nuclear Agency and Department of Defense.

and an official National Park since 1930. On 24 November 1961, the tenmillionth visitor passed through the Caverns. At the time, the Carlsbad
Caverns formed New Mexico's most popular tourist attraction. 24
When the AEC first approached Carlsbad officials in the summer of
1958 for a 'possible July, 1959, Plowshare test, they met with mixed local
response. The city newspaper, the Current-Argus, welcomed the idea
as an economic boon for the region. 25 "Nuclear Emphasis Shifts from
Geneva to Carlsbad" blared one headline. 26
But other area residents expressed doubt. Farmers feared that radioactive fallout might damage their crops, while Park Service officials and
motel owners expressed concern that the proposed 10 kt Gnome shot
might collapse the famed caverns. The strongest reservations came from
the potash mine owners and miners, who feared similar damage to the
mine shafts.
The AEC recognized the validity of these objections and convened
a panel of experts, recommended by the National Academy of Sciences,
to study the matter. The panel reviewed the local geography, gathered
seismic data from the NTS, and concluded in February 1959 that Gnome
would cause no damage to crops (it would be contained underground).
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Project Gnome, Carlsbad, New Mexico, 11 December 1961. View of shaft after the
detonation on 10 December 1961. Courtesy of Borden, Reynolds Electrical &
Engineering Company, Inc. Print no. AEC-62-6433.

They similarly concluded that the proposed test would not be powerful
enough to damage either the potash mines or the Caverns.
Although potash industry executives had been AEC guests to the
NTS to witness several 1958 detonations, they remained skeptical. Their
lawyers approached both L10yds of London and the Nuclear Energy Property Insurance Association to underwrite the risk of mine collapseY
After Clinton Anderson helped arrange a compromise, most of the local
businessmen fell into line. 28
The 1958 moratorium on testing temporarily shelved the initial Gnome
plans, but the AEC utilized the interim to detonate other, non-nuclear,
blasts in preparation for its eventual lifting. 29 Thus, when nuclear testing did resume in 1961, Gnome was ready for rapid deployment. 30 With
Chariot in Alaska now canceled, the AEC turned the spotlight on Carlsbad
as the pioneer Plowshare experiment. Gnome was billed as the world's
first atom ic blast for wholly peaceful purposes.3'
On 23 October 1961, President Kennedy gave the official go-ahead.
When Carlsbad citizens heard the news, the Current-Argus noted, they
became "quietly jubilant."32 As shot time grew closer, anticipation and
rhetoric both intensified. New Mexico's sole Congressman, Thomas G.
Morris, observed that as Alamogordo had become the symbol of the
beginning of the A-Bomb, so would Carlsbad symbolize the beginning
of peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.J3 The Current-Argus predicted
that in the future Carlsbad would be known not only as the home of the

SZASZ

355

Cavity
void

Project Gnome. Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New
Mexico. Print no. 96246.

Carlsbad Caverns but also as the home of Project Gnome. 34
The underground blast was scheduled for 10 December 1961, and
the AEC handled all preparations with considerable skill. They arranged
a series of talks at the Carlsbad High School the evening before, where
prominent local citizens and Edward Teller spoke of the "miracle of the
decade. "35
On the next morning, busses took visitors to the designated observer area, 4.5 miles from surface ground zero. Loudspeakers broadcast
the countdown to the immediate vicinity and Carlsbad radio picked up
the transmission for those sitting in their own vehicles on State Road 37,
Potash Road. Visitors were told to bring binoculars but scientists expected little, if any, visual impact. Scaled down to 3.1 kt, the nuclear
device rested at 1,184 feet underground, at the end of a I, I 16-foot button-hook tunnel that was expected to seal itself off after the explosion.
As a further precaution, the six potash companies, one within five
miles of Gnome, ordered all their miners to the surface during"the shot.
At the last minute, the AEC agreed to reimburse the potash industry for
the shutdown loss.36 National Park Service officials also kept visitors
out of the Carlsbad Caverns during blast time. Originally scheduled for
8:00 AM, meteorologists postponed the detonation twice as surface winds
over ground zero would have brought any unexpected fallout toward
Carlsbad.
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The list of national media and foreign visitors attending Gnome
proved impressive. Seventy-one newsmedia officials were there, including representatives from ABC, CBS, Life, Time, the New York Times,
US News and World Report and UPI. Official UN representatives also
attended, as well as nine international visitors. The Soviets were invited
to observe but declined the invitation. 37
. The press gave considerable publicity to the four announced goals
of Gnome. First, they hoped to learn how nuclear explosions in the
Carlsbad area salt beds differed from those detonated in tuff, the chief
rock strata of the NTS. The scientists believed that different rock strata
coupled energy into seismic waves in different patterns. They needed
such seismic data for a salt bed explosion. One aspect of this, a theme
virtually ignored by the popular press but clear to all those in the nuclear
industry, was that such seismic data would allow Americans to detect
any secret nuclear test that the Soviets might detonate in their own salt
beds. Second, LRL and Los Alamos scientists set up an elaborate neutron wheel in the tunnel to make neutron cross-section measurements
to aid nuclear reactor development. Third, scientists also set up experiments to investigate the possibility of recovering radioisotopes from
the blast. These would be used for future scientific and industrial applications. Lastly, the aspect of Gnome that received the greatest publicity
lay with the hope that the blast would create a vast reservoir of heat that
would be gradually released over an extended period oftime. 38 If the salt
beds indeed retained the heat as expected, then workers could pump
water into the newly formed cavity, extract the energy as steam, and turn
it into electricity.39 Locals also hoped that the Gnome blast might perhaps also create underground reservoirs or aquifers for water storage,
flood control, and the recharging of water-bearing strata. 40 Consequently, Project Gnome embodied a number of both local and national
expectations.
At noon on 10 December 1961, LRL scientists detonated Gnome as
the first Plowshare explosion. It was also the first continental nuclear
explosion outside of the Nevada Test Site since Trinity. The 3.1 kt blast
performed as expected. It produced extremely high temperatures and created an underground cavity of approximately 960,000 cubic feet. The
cavity was about seventy-five feet high and about 150 feet in diameter,
and newsmen likened it to an underground eight-story building as wide
as the base of the U.S. Capitol. All previous cavities from NTS shots had
collapsed almost immediately but the surface of Gnome remained intact.
Scientists expected it to remain so for years.
Five months later, when the radiation had decayed to safe levels, a
number of scientists entered the Gnome cavity to view the situation
first-hand (a practice that would not be allowed today). Sandia National
Laboratory scientist Wendell Weart recalled the striking color of the
walls, for the shot's gamma rays had transformed them from dull gray
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Project Gnome cavity. Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico. Print no. 96251

into deep shades of blue, yellow, and black. The radioactivity in the
cavity had largely been trapped by the melted salt and rock that lay at
the botto~. Still, the extreme heat-100°F with sixty percent humiditymade all visits necessarily brief. 41
On the first anniversary of the Gnome blast, the AEC brieflyescorted U.S. news media into the cavity. The resulting photographs, especially those of men standing on the Gnome rubble, proved startling. 42
Scientists continued to study the Gnome cavity for several years.
If the underground nuclear explosion at Gnome had gone as expected,
the crowd of visitors would have observed little. Initially, scientists had
estimated that anyone standing at the Gnome control point would not
have seen or detected anything, unless he or she possessed scientific
instruments. 43 Edward Teller repeated this belief at his high school talk.
"I hope all of us observers will be disappointed," he'said. "If everything
goes right, we will see nothing." Later he added an afterthought: "I think
there might be a little cloud of dust if the ground jumps."44
But Gnome visitors saw more than they bargained for. Over surface
ground zero, the earth heaved about four feet af)d most people felt a
"thump." The shock sent a blanket of dust swirling across the site, and
the seismic wave cracked a filling station wall at Malaga, twelve miles
away. It also knocked cans off a shelf in nearby Loving. One rancher
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remarked of the shock: "That shook up your rattlesnakes."45 The planned
experiment with conventional explosives at surface ground zero, designed
to dtlibrate the shock to the atmosphere with the seismic effects of the
detonation underground, went off unexpectedly, at the exact same time
as the nuclear blast. This sent a premature fireball and cloud of smoke
into the air. Since the image of the mushroom cloud had become familiar
to most Americans by 1961, many visitors involuntarily ducked. 46 The
groundshock also jiggled many stationary automatic cameras, blurring a
large number of the initial images.
The chief miscalculation, however, appeared two to three minutes
after detonation, when a plume of what seemed to be gray smoke emerged
from the elevator shaft, about 340 meters southwest of surface ground
zero. This plume, which turned out not to be smoke but radioactive steam,
continued in earnest for about thirty minutes. Observers could still detect small amounts of steam at the shaft the next day. The release of this
unexpected radioactivity also damaged numerous photographs. Life's
images were all below par.
Contrary to expectations, the steam produced by the heat of the
blast had breached the self-sealing shaft through an unnoticed fault
line and had escaped to the surface via the elevator shaft. The "vented"
cloud moved slowly in a north-northwest direction toward the town of
Artesia. When radiation levels reached about 2 mill i-roentgens per hour,
state police halted all traffic between the control point and Carlsbad for
almost three hours. Most of the approximately 300 observers who had
witnessed the blast and now were on their way home had to return to the
control point. Officials later washed down the seven cars that had driven
into the region. 47 The AEC also purchased animal feed for several months
for those Artesia ranchers whose fields lay in the direct path of the
fallout. 48
Over time, the unexpected venting of this radioactive steam produced two regional anecdotes. The first involved Edward Teller. According to legend, someone pointed to the white cloud and asked Teller
what it was. In his thick Hungarian accent, Teller responded: "Vy, that
looks like steam."49 Since Teller observed the actual blast from a helicopter, which did not land until later, this story probably derives from a
post-shot question-and-answer session held at the Observation Point.
There Teller was, indeed, asked: "What kind of vapor is that?" His laconic response: "white vapor." With retelling, this anecdote has become
enhanced. 50
The second anecdote involves the residents of nearby Artesia. According to this story, radiation monitors stationed near the mouth of the
Rio Grande subsequently detected increased radioactivity in the waters
there. Artesians claimed that this unexpected increase came primarily
from the Gnome cloud, which had dropped radionuclides into the Pecos
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Gnome in present state. Courtesy of Mark Ruwedel (1996).

River, from whence they eventually made their way down the Rio
Grande. 51 Monitors on the lower Rio Grande may, indeed, have detected
increased radioactivity. But the origin of the radionuclides is far more
likely to have come from worldwide, above-ground testing than from
the accidental venting at Gnome.
In spite of these setbacks, immediate reaction to Gnome remained
upbeat. As they plugged the radioactive steam leak with blast furnace
clay, scientists claimed that they could salvage perhaps seventy percent of the data. The neutron wheels were initially believed lost but later
they were recovered and sent to the LRL and Los Alamos for analysis.
Scientists also declared the isotope creation experiments worthwhile,
and even spoke optimistically about recovering virtually intact images
. from the fogged camera film. 52 Ronald E. Rawson of the LRL spoke of
"some disappointments and also some very exciting results," while
George Cowan of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory termed it a "qualified success."53 The chief seismologist for the U.S. Coast and Geodetic
Survey said that the extensive shock waves "flabbergasted everybody,"
for they were picked up in Finland, Sweden, and Japan. The seismological data probably proved the most valuable. 54 Gary W. Higgins of LRL
put it this way: "Gnome has been an extremely successful experiment
and has laid the 'groundwork for several additional and valuable
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projects."55 PhilO. Randolph ofLRL, however, pointed out that it might
be years before the long-range objectives could beaccomplished. 56
Aside from the radioactive steam cloud,the largest disappointment
came with the lack of any hoped-for underground heat reservoir that
might be turned into a power source. Post-shot drilling discovered that
no such reservoir had been created by the blast. 57 In 1965, LRL issued a
"final report" on Gnome that tried to sum up the results in neutral language. Still, the disappointment was obvious. 58 The cancellation of a
second experiment planned for the same location-Project Coach-reflects this lack of accomplishment. 59
For six years after the test, Gnome remained on what the AEC termed
"standby status." Officials erected a fence around the region to keep
out livestock and set up a plaque that detailed the historic importance of
the site. Alldrillirtg or mining in the region was prohibited forever.
Their experiments finished in 1968, the AEC prepared to return the
680-acre Gnome site to the Bureau of Land Management. Consequently,
workers removed all contaminated materials and facilities, and plugged
all drill holes, save two kept open for purposes of monitoring. Workers
reinserted some of the contaminated debris into the 1,200-foot entry
shaft and sealed it. They also shipped contaminated equipment to the
NTS for storage. All was done according to 1968 AEC criteria for surface
radiological contamination. Radiation monitors continued to visit the
site on a regular basis.
A 1972 monitoring crew discovered that some previously buried
material northeast of the access shaft had become slightly exposed, and
the DOE paid closer attention to that section for the next five years. In
1977, DOE contracted with Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc.
and Fenix and Scisson, Inc. to decontaminate the Gnome site. In 1977,
DOE guidelines had been altered from the 1968 dose rate measurements
to soil contamination limits, two non-interchangeable systems of data
collection. 60 'Two years later, this two-million-dollar project began in
earnest. Workers reactivated power lines, improved roads to the Gnome
site, and cleaned the area water wells. About twenty-five workers took
contaminated surface soil and salt, crushed and slurried it, and then
pumped the mixture into the Gnome cavity, filling it to approximately
eighty percent capaCity. Workers placed other Gnome waste into barrels
for shipment to low-level storage facilities at the NTS. When they finally returned the land to the custody of the BLM in 1980, the DOE
placed no restrictions on surface use. Today, cattle forage over the site,
which also abounds with wildlife. The region boasts one of the highest
hawk concentrations in the world. Five area ranchers also benefit from
the Gnome well, drilled by the AEC in 1961, which was made operational
in 1982.
The site of Project Gnome, however, is still surveyed on an annual
basis. A 1991 visit found that while underground tritium and cesium
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levels excee.ded EPA standards the contamination remained confined to
the site. "There are no certainties in life," one official noted, "but from
the Dydrological reports I've read, it's not going to get into the drinking
water."61 In 1995, ecologist Jim Kenney led a team of New Mexico Environmental Evaluators to survey Gnome yet again. Although the team
made no major recommendations, they agreed that "additional work"
would be necessary to see if any contamination existed at greater soil
depths or outside the survey area. 62
As scientists and technicians from DOE contractor Westinghouse
today prepare the Gnome area for the highly controversial Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), they have occasionally discovered trace isotopes of Plutonium and Americium in the region. These radionuclides
have not leaked froI]1 any WIPP waste (at this writing, none has been
sent there). Instead, they derive from either the plume of steam raised by
Gnome or from a well-known Gnome waste burial site. 63 Although the
radiation from Gnome is still measureable, scientists believe that it has
been unable to enter the region's ecosystem. The current consensus is
that it is not harmful to either wildlife or human activity.64
Gasbuggy
,
Six years and over two hundred weapons-related and Plowshare
explosions occurred in the years from Gnome to Gasbuggy, the third and
final New Mexico nuclear detonation of 10 December 1967. But Gasbuggy
was also hailed at the time as a "pioneering" nuclear project. It was
touted as the first joint federal government-private industry venture of
the Plowshare program. The private industry was El Paso Natural Gas,
and the goal was to draw upon underground nuclear detonations to
improve gas flows from low-production natural gas fields. 65
Gas companies had relied on the technique of hydraulic fracturing
of low-yield fields for years. In "tight" or low-flow rock strata, field
workers would inject explosives, such as nitroglycerin, to create cavities that would improve gas flow. In fact, El Paso Natural Gas had often
used nitroglycerin to enhance their San Juan Basin fields in the
Farmington area. Such conventional fracturing utilized between 1,000
and 2,500 quarts of explosive per blast. If successful, they might increase gas production 10 percent over a twenty-year period, the usual
lifetime of such a field. The hoped-for nuclear fracturing experiment at
Gasbuggy was set at a high level, 26 kt, slightly larger than the blasts at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. It became the equivalent of 12.5 million quarts of nitroglycerin. Scientists hoped that this fracture might
capture, perhaps, seventy percent of all gas in the area. 66
The acknowledged national energy crisis of the late 1960s fueled
the urgency of the program. If the nuclear fracturing technique at
Gasbuggy proved successful, one report suggested, it could be used in
similar low-permeability natural gas fields all through the mountain West.
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Project Gasbuggy site. From Project Gasbuggy: A Government-Industry Natural
Gas Production Stimulation Experiment Using Nuclear Explosives, Issued by Project
Gasbuggy Joint Office of Information, 15 September 1967. Courtesy of U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, £1 Paso Gas Company, and Department of the Interior.

Some Bureau of Mines officials even predicted that Gasbuggy-type explosions might even double the nation's gas reserves. 67 Officials cautioned, however, that the final results of this nuclear experiment might
not be known for several years.
In June 1965, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior informed New
Mexico Congressman Joseph M. Montoya and Governor Jack Campbell
that theAEC had decided to test a 10-kt device in the state's gasfields. 68
The site chosen for the nuclear fracturing of low-yield fields lay on EJ
Paso Natural Gas properties in a pine-covered forest in the San Juan
Basin of the Carson National Forest, just to the west of the Jicarilla
Apache Reservation. The closest community of any size was Farmington,
then a town of about 23,000, fifty-five air miles to the west. The hamlet
of Dulce, with 500 people, lay fifteen miles to the northeast. The Navajo
Dam was about fifty miles to the northwest.
A visitor to the Gasbuggy installation in 1967 would have discovered a typical Four Corners mining venture. Work crews drilled several
exploratory holes and then a very large (18.5 inch diameter) hole 4,240
feet into the Lewis Shale formation. They used extremely large pipes,
which proved difficult to handle, to house the nuclear device. AEC officials placed seismic recording devices in Dulce, Cuba, Farmington, El
Vado Dam, and Navajo Dam. New Mexico State Police also made plans to
close all roads in the vicinity at Zero hour. As a final precaution, El Paso
Natural Gas workers physically cut apart all gas pipelines within a five-
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mile radius of Gasbuggy ground zero.
In general, the numerous state, federal, and tribal agencies involved
worked together well. The Jicarilla Apache tribe, which derived much of
its revenue from oil and gas production, approved the experiment. The
State ofNew Mexico built a $100,000 al1-weather road through the Jicaril1a
Reservation to the site. Congress approved the funds and the Secretary
of the Interior, Stuart Udal1, signed all necessary documents. The AEC,
the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Mines, LRL staff, and EI
Paso Natural Gas had all studied this concept for over six years. Both
Washington and private companies had their fingers crossed that such
nuclear stimulation might be the answer to the nation's energy woes.
As with previous Plowshare shots, the AEC welcomed all publicity
for this venture. They supplied speakers to the Farmington Elks Club,
which hosted a popular two-day pre-shot symposium in September.
Local residents heard numerous lectures from top governmental officials. Fred Holzer, of the LRL, author of an extensive pre-shot report,
spoke there, as did several other scientists. Discussion ranged over the
origin of Plowshare, the purpose of Gasbuggy, possible ground motion
at the time of blast, and, especially, safety measures. The speakers all
emphasized safety, although not always in the most eloquent form. As
scientist Roland F. Beers phrased it: "Nearly all centers of population
within the expected area of human perception will be instrumented."69
The AEC also staged a major symposium for the news media at the
Albuquerque Civic Auditorium on Saturday, 9 December. New Mexico's
Lieutenant Governor, Lee Francis, welcomed the various dignitaries, including about 300 top-level visitors from government and industry. The
group later boarded chartered buses to Farmington for another Dedication Day Program on Sunday.
.
By this time, however, the story of Plowshare underground explosions had lost its media glamour. 70 The Farmington Times might hail
Gasbuggy as the top state story of the year, but this did not translate to
the national stage. The national media were conspicuous by their absence at the Gasbuggy shot. Interestingly, o'pposition to the test was
similarly absent. No group made any legal attempt to prevent either the
detonation or the later flaring of the radioactive gas. Contemporary criticism seemed limited to a crank letter from California and a more balanced
one from W. A. Boyle, president of the United Mine Workers ofAmerica.
Boyle called the explosion a "mad proposal" that would release "dan. gerous amounts of radioactivity into the earth's atmosphere."71 Earlier
concerns that Gasbuggy might cause the collapse of Navajo Dam or El
Vado Dam had apparently been satisfied.
As with Gnome, the AEC encouraged the local public to attend the
detonation. The thirty-minute countdown was broadcast over a public
address system for nearby listeners. All went as planned and at 12:30
p.m., Sunday, 10 December 1967, Gasbuggy exploded. The blast created
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Project Gasbuggy. Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New
Mexico. Negative no. 96250.

an underground cavity 160 feet in diameter, which soon collapsed to
form a zone or chimney about the size of a half-block-square, thirtyfive-story building.
The ground at surface ground zero rumbled but did not collapse.
The only surface damage came with a few minor cracks in the dirt access
road, a bent axle to a cable reel, and modest damage to some electrical
equipment at the control point. Nearby gas wells, some as close as 2,600
feet to surface ground 'zero, experienced no structural damage. 72
In fact, in spite of all the publicity, Gasbuggy proved to be quite
without drama. As Al Kendrick of Aztec recalled in 1995, "We didn't
hear anything. There was a shock wave that was visible. The vegetation
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moved as the shock wave came in our direction. We were primarily looking for something to erupt in the air."73
About eight hours after detonation, monitors detected small amounts
of xenon and krypton at the head of the firing cable. Radioactive gas had
somehow found its way up the cable to the surface. Within an hour and
a half, these cables were sealed off. Eight hours later, all but a small area
adjacent to the well head had been opened to normal activity.
As soon as possible, officials tried to assess the consequences of
Gasbuggy. The re-entry drill holes brought some additional radiation to
the surface, but this, too, was carefully monitored. The flaring of the gas
from the subsequently drilled test wells also released radionuclides into
the air. By 10 January 1966, El Paso Natural Gas workers had completed
their re-entry drilling. Then the testing began.
Unfortunately, the results of the tests did not bear out earlier hopes.
Prior gas pressure in the Gasbuggy reservoir was about 1,050 pounds
per square inch (psi) but after the shot, the pressure registered at only
950 psi. Hopes existed, however, that the pressure would soon rise to
normal or above. Fred Holzer's preliminary post-shot report noted that
"the results available at this point in time from the total post-shot program are not consistent with a picture that depicts GB-ER communication clearly with a region of high permeability."74 Holzer admitted,
however, that his pessimistic views were not shared by all El Paso Natural Gas people. The AEC cautioned that everything needed to be further
analyzed over the next years. 75
The professional scientific journals expressed similar caution about
the results. In October, 1973, The Journal ofPetroleum Technology ran
an extensive article on the Gasbuggy Experiment. They listed as the
crucial question the extent to which the blast had fractured the rocks
beyond the "chimney." They concluded that Gasbuggy had extended
only about 220 feet beyond the chimney, a relatively small distance,
indeed. 76 Further experiments of nuclear fracturing at Rulison, Colorado
(l0 September 1969; 43 kt) and Rio Blanco, Colorado (simultaneous detonations of33 kt devices, 17 May 1973) also proved disappointing. One
finds at the time such phrases as "unique experiment" and "technical
success," but this was whistling in the dark. 77 Although the Gasbuggy
experiment increased the San Juan Basin gas by a modest amount, the
gain never approximated earlier expectations.
In addition, of course, the gas in the vicinity of the blast had become radioactive. While El Paso Natural Gas spokesmen argued that this
radioactive gas could be easily mixed with other gas and thus diluted to
totally safe levels, by 1970 public opinion had begun to shift. The anxiety over strontium-90, opposition to fallout" from the NTS, and later
(1979) the accident at Three Mile Island had made Americans aware of
the dangers of radioactivity. No amount of public relations from the El
Paso Gas Company could have convinced New Mexico citizens to let
I
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radioactive gas, no matter at what level, into their homes. 78 DOE hydrologist Kevin Leary put it succinctly in 1995: "They tried to stimulate
gas flow by fracturing the sandstone. It didn't work."79
Although there was little release of radionuclides at the time of the
shot, when El Paso Natural Gas workers returned to drill the cavity, they
did release additional radioactivity into the air, especially in flow tests
one and two, conducted on 12-13 January 1968. The flaring of the gas
produced several radionuclides, chiefly xenon-133, with a 5.3-day half
life, and also low levels oftritium. 80
The release was deemed acceptable and except for a hastily erected
fence, the area soon returned to its chief pre-shot use-hunting. Locals
jested that the deer there were easy to bag because they glowed in the
dark. Concern remained on ajocular level until 1972. That year the DOE
instituted a hydraulic monitoring program that has continued to the
present. In August and September 1978, the El Paso Gas Company, which
had completed testing two years earlier cleaned up the site by plugging
surface holes and removing all surface features. The large tank filled
with tritium-contaminated liquid was re-inserted into the earth, and the
hole capped. Workers placed other low level or impossible-to-determine waste into barrels. Afterwards they sealed, labeled, and externally
steam cleaned the containers before shipping them to the NTS for burial.
Careful monitoring of all personnel engaged in the cleanup revealed no
overexposure. The DOE decided to allow one well to remain open as part
of a long-term monitoring program. 81 Officials placed a small stone marker
at the site to detail its historical significance and then left.
In the late 1980s, the DOE office in Nevada made a series of surface
monitoring missions to examine all non-NTS sites that had been used
for underground nuclear tests. Concern for long-term hydrologic monito ring also sent teams to Gasbuggy in both 1986 and 1994 to examine the
possible migration of the radionuclides.
.
The teams found that most of the radiation was still contained in the
underground cavity, ninety percent locked in the fused rock glass. Only
the drill-back and the firing of gas for test purposes had brought radionuclides to the surface. These releases had both been well documented
and, according to records, controlled. The team found no soil or water
samples that exceeded DOE site restoration criteria; nor did they uncover any waste barrels at the site. The only man-made isotope they
found was cesium 137, which proved detectable in certain forest litter
piles.
As for the vital question of possible groundwater contamination,
the team was optimistic. They estimated that water in the Ojo Alamo
. sandstone moved at .04 feet per year. By the time it reached the San Juan
River, about fifty miles away, the tritium, strontium-90, and cesium-I37
would have all decayed to levels well below guidelines,sz
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Gasbuggy site in present state, Courtesy of Mark Ruwedel (1996),

Conclusion
The sites of New Mexico's three nuclear explosions today are all
commemorated with modest markers. But their legacy extends far beyond the brief messages inscribed on these brass plaques. Although
the Trinity test produced no controversy at the time, its inevitable aftermath in Hiroshima and Nagasaki has inaugurated a discussion of tactics
and morality among historians and the general populace that shows
little likelihood of disappearing,83
The Plowshare experiments of Gnome and Gasbuggy were, perhaps,
an attempt to compensate for this tragic loss of life at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Unfortunately, they proved terribly disappointing. As one
1978 book on Plowshare phrased it: "Experts still cannot agree whether
nuclear explosives employed for peaceful ends may eventually result in
damage of greater weight than the gains they provide."84
The most enduring legacy of New Mexico's n'uclear detonations,
however, rests with tht: impact upon the environment. Al1 blasts produced radionuclides that contaminated both air and soil to varying degrees. Although the federal government has cleaned up each site on
several occasions, residues stil1 remain. 85 There is no water at Trinity,
but officials routinely monitor the nearby Chapudera Mesa and test the
wells in both Rio Arriba and Eddy counties to see if u'nderground aquifers reflect migration of radioactive materials. Such monitoring, as one
spokesman at Gnome noted in 1978, "will be continued indefinitely."86
Here, perhaps, lies the ultimate legacy of New Mexico's three atomic
detonations.
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